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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
also give the trustee the advantage of leasing for longer periods to the
benefit of both the life beneficiary and the remaindermen, and thereby
carry out the purposes of the trust in those instances where a beneficial
short term lease cannot be made.
Louis R. GILBERT
Trusts - Stock Dividends - Allocation to Income or Corpus -
Testator created a testamentary trust, using as corpus 1300 shares of
stock. Subsequent thereto a stock dividend was declared, increasing the
"corpus" by 1219 shares. The life tenant under the trust brought an
action for a declaratory judgment seeking to have the stock dividend
declared income so as to be distributable to him. Held: In the absence
of any intention to the contrary by the settlor, a stock dividend declared
at a regular director's meeting to be paid from current earnings becomes
part of the corpus, and is not distributable to the life tenant as ordinary
income. Armentrout v. Armentrout, 100 N.E. 2d 555 (Ohio Probate
Court. 1951).
The Ohio court, in the principal case, had little difficulty in justifying
its position because of a well-reasoned earlier Ohio decision which had
clearly established the law in that state.' A study of other jurisdictions,
however, reveals at least a four-way split of authority, with some juris-
dictions following a modified form of one or the other of the four
principal rules. 2 The Massachusetts rule,3 followed in the principal
case, distinguishes between a stock dividend and a cash dividend, and
declares that the stock dividend becomes part of corpus while the cash
dividend goes to income.4 The application of the Massachusetts rule
has been held not to be affected by the fact that the stock dividend is a
regular dividend, although it would seem that this application of the
rule is open to severe criticism. 5 Having once decided that a particular
I Lamb v. Lehmann, 110 Ohio St. 59, 143 N.E. 276, 42 A.L.R. 437 (1924).2 This article is limited to a discussion of the disposition of stock dividends in
the declaring corporation. No attempt is made to discuss the problems pre-
sented by stock rights, liquidating dividends, extraordinary cash dividends,
stock dividends in another corporation etc. For an extensive discussion of
these problems, see the annotation in 130 A.L.R. 486; 1942 Wis. L. REV. 299.
3 Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 96 Am. Dec. 705 (1868).
4 This rule has been adopted in the UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr, § 5,
9A U.L.A. 233.
5 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Tucker, 51 R.I. 507, 155 Atl. 661, 83
A.L.R. 1253 (1931); modified on rehearsing, 52 R.I. 277, 160 Atl. 465, 83
A.L.R. 1259 (1932). Generally stock dividends are considered to be "extra-
ordinary" in nature, i.e., dividends which represent an accumulation of cor-
porate earnings other than those accuring during regular dividend periods,
which are not paid at regular intervals, which are unusual in size etc. When,
as in this Rhode Island case, the Massachusetts rule is applied to an "or-
dinary" or "regular" dividend, and it is the policy of the corporation to de-
clare only "regular" stock dividends, the life tenant will be deprived of all
benefit in the trust. While in the cited case, the court (on rehearing) did give
relief to the life tenant, by stating that it was the duty of the trustee (there
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dividend is cash or stock, no consideration is given to the time covered
by the accumulation of earnings which the dividend represents, nor is
any attempt made to apportion the dividend in the event the earnings it,
represents accrued partly before and partly after the time when the
stock became subject to the life interest.6
The Pennsylvania rule,7 followed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
is concerned primarily with preserving the "intact" value of corpus,
rather than with considering the type of dividend (stock or cash)
declared.
"The effect of the rule is to give the life tenant the income which
has been earned since the trust came into being, but, at the same
time, to preserve the value of the corpus as it was at the date of
the death of the testator, or, to use a more convenient term, to
preserve the intact value of the estate. This intact value includes
the par value of the stock, plus any accumulation of income
earned before the death of the testator. . . . An extraordinary
dividend paid out of accumulated earnings, presumptively belongs
to the life tenant, but if it be shown that the distribution impairs
the intact value of the estate, the court will make an apportion-
ment."9
The Kentucky rule' appears to be an amalgamation of the Pennsyl-
vania and the Massachusetts rules. Like the Pennsylvania rule, it rejects
the character of the dividend (stock or cash) as the controlling factor,
and like the Massachusetts rule, it refuses to inquire as to the time that
the earnings covered by the dividend were earned. If the dividend
(stock or cash) is declared during the life interest, and does not repre-
sent capital, it goes to the life tenant regardless of when the earnings
were accumulated. Since this doctrine could easily deplete corpus, it
has little support in judicial decisions. 1
being no contrary intention expressed in the trust) to sell the stock corpus,
and reinvest the proceeds in "income producing" stock, the inequities of the
original rule are apparent. Under the RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236, comment
h, regular stock dividends belong to income.
G Supra, note 3. 130 A.L.R. 486, 524, indicates that there are sixteen jurisdic-
tions, including the United States Supreme Court, which follow the Massa-
chusetts rule.
Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857), was apparently the first case to adopt a
system of apportionment between income and corpus.
s Estate of Paddock, 213 Wis. 409, 251 N.W. 229 (1933); Will of Jenkins,
199 Wis. 131, 225 N.W. 733 (1929). See also, Estate of Boyle, 235 Wis. 591,
294 N.WA. 29, 130 A.L.R. 486 (1940); State ex rel. Coykendal v. Karel, 215
Wis. 505, 255 N.W. 132 (1934); Estate of Dittmer, 197 Wis. 304, 222 N.W.
323 (1928) ; Soehnlein v. Soehnlein, 146 Wis. 330, 131 N.W. 739 (1911).
9 Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200, 56 A.L.R. 1303 (1927). 130
A.L.R. 486, 538, indicates that there are twelve jurisdictions which follow
the Pennsylvania rule.
'0Hubley v. Wolfe, 259 Ky. 574, 82 S.W. 2d 830, 101 AL.R. 1359 (1935). The
Kentucky rule, however, has since been modified in Kentucky by statute, L.
1950, Sen. B. 147. Stock dividends of the same corporation and the same
class and equaling ten percent or more of the outstanding shares are trust
capital; otherwise stock dividends are income.
11 Only Kentucky and some early New York cases seem to have clearly approved
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The final rule, the English rule,12 resembles somewhat the Massa-
chusetts doctrine, and repudiates the Pennsylvania concept of apportion-
ment. It seems to be primarily concerned with the intent of the de-
claring corporation; if that intent was to convert accumulated earnings
into capital, the dividend belongs to corpus; if it was to distribute those
earnings as profits, then it belongs to the life tenant.13 This would
appear to be quite similar to the Massachusetts inquiry into whether a
dividend is stock or cash.
A brief resum6 of the three principal American rules reveals that the
Massachusetts rule considers as controlling the external character of the
dividend; the Pennsylvania rule looks to the source of the dividend; and
the Kentucky rule is concerned with the time the dividend is declared.' 4
All rules, of course, are rules of construction, and apply only if a
contrary intent of the settlor is not expressed in the trust instrument.
A stock dividend earned and declared during the life estate, which does
not reduce the book value of corpus, will, under the Massachusetts rule,
become part of corpus, while under the Pennsylvania and Kentucky
rules, it will be distributed to the life tenant. A similar dividend, earned
before the life estate has commenced, will become a part of corpus under
the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania rules, but will go to income under
the Kentucky rule. If the stock dividend is earned partly before and
partly after the commencement of the life estate, Massachusetts will
give it to the corpus; Kentucky will distribute it to income; and Pennsyl-
vania will apportion it so as to preserve the intact value of corpus as of
the date it became subject to the life estate.' 5
Under both the English and Pennsylvania rules, it would seem that
an inquiry is necessary into the internal functioning of the corporation,
and that regardless of the action of the board of directors, the court
of the Kentucky rule. However, In re Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723,
50 L.R.A. (NS) 510, Ann. Cas, 1915A 298 (1913) reversed the earlier New
York cases and followed instead the Pennsylvania rule. In 1926, New York,
by statute, adopted in effect the Massachusetts rule. Delaware has "repudi-
ated" the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania rules, and adopted the "American"
rule, to which, says the Delaware court, Kentucky has also subscribed.
Bryan v. Aiken, 10 Del. Ch. 446, 86 Atl. 674, 45 L.R.A. (NS) 477 (1913);
DuPont v. Peyton, 15 Del. Ch. 255, 136 At. 149 (1927).
12 Bouch v. Sproule, 12 App. Cas. 385 (1887).
13Ibid. "When a testator or settlor directs or permits the subject of his dis-
position to remain as shares of stock in a company which has the power
either of distributing its profits as dividend, or of converting them in to
capital, and the company validly exercises this power, such exercise of its
power is binding on all persons interested under the testator or settlor in the
shares; and consequently what is paid by the company as dividend goes to
the tenant for life, and what is paid by the company to the shareholder as
capital, or appropriated as an increase of the capital stock in the concern,
innures to the benefit of all who are interested in the capital."
14Long v. Rike, 50 F. 2d 124, 81 A.L.R. 521 (7th Cir. 1931); cert. den. 284
U.S. 657, 52 S.Ct. 35, 76 L.Ed. 557 (1931).
15 33 Am. JuR., LIFE ESTATES, REMAINDERS, AND RE ERSIONS, § 381; 130 A.L.R.
486, 558.
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could, in the interests of the life tenant, declare that a stock dividend,
which is basically a recapitalization of surplus,'6 is instead a "severance"
of the surplus in the nature of a cash dividend. Perhaps this "dual"
aspect of a stock dividend, on the one hand a recapitalization and on the
other hand, a "severance," can in some abstract manner promote
"justice" between the life tenant and the remainderman. On the other
hand, in a state like Wisconsin, where ordinary cash dividends are
apparently payable to the life tenant regardless of their source," it
could also work a great injustice. Thus a corporation with a capital
investment of $100,000 and a surplus of $50,000 at the time of the
settlor's death may increase its surplus to $100,000 and declare a stock
dividend of $50,000. Under the Pennsylvania (and Wisconsin) rule,
this would be payable to the life tenant since there was no "entrench-
ment" on the "intact value" of the corpus as it existed when the trust
was created. Should the corporation then pay a series of ordinary cash
dividends out of its remaining surplus, which dividends would go to the
life tenant,' the interest of he remainderman could be reduced con-
siderably below the amount existing at the time the trust was created,
and thus presumably violate the settlor's "intent." While this "deficit"
could be regained in a "prosperous" year, it is usually the practice of
corporations to provide in advance (by adding to surplus or recapitaliz-
ing by means of a stock dividend) for the "lean" years. For the courts
to intervene and declare that any provision made for the "lean" years is
payable to the life tenant, and then to allow the life tenant to collect
his dividends during those "lean" years, is to substitute the judgment
of the court for the judgment of the board of directors, at the expense
of the remainderman.19
A further objection to the Pennsylvania rule, which objection is also
applicable to the Kentucky rule, is that it tends to reduce the propor-
tionate interest and voting power of the trust in the corporation.20 This,
however, does not appear to be too valid an objection. There is no rule
of law which requires that the voting power of a trust corpus be main-
16 The principle of recapitalization (as opposed to a "severance") which a stock
dividend represents, is recognized in Federal Tax Law. Towne v. Eisner, 245
U.S. 418, 38 S.Ct. 158, 62 L.Ed. 372, L.R.A. 1918 D. 254 (1917); Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct 189, 64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570 (1920).
17 "It may be taken as established in this state that in the absence of directions
in the will to the contrary, ordinary cash dividends are considered as income
and belong to the life tenant." Estate of Boyle, supra, note 8; Estate of
Dittmer, supra, note 8.
Is Ibid.
19 "The Pennsylvania doctrine is not a rule at all, but leaves the chancellor a
wide latitude and discretion and permits an utter disregard of well-settled
rule pertaining to control by corporations over their net earnings. It results
logically and inevitably in substituting the judgment of the court for that
of the board of directors, and makes the corporate policies a matter of
judicial determination." Lamb v. Lehmann, supra, note 1.
20 Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W. 91, 56 A.L.R. 1276
(1927).
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tained, if the corpus itself is kept intact. Certainly if the corporation
issued new stock, giving to the trustee preferential subscription rights,
the trustee could not charge the life tenant in order to buy the necessary
new stock needed to preserve proportionate voting power. The problem
is relegated to the academic level where the trust corpus consists of only
a few shares in a large corporation.
The Massachusetts rule, on the other hand, while criticized as a mere
rule of expediency and lacking in fundamental justice, does offer a much
easier and more logical solution to the. problem. It is founded on the
premises that a stock dividend is in fact no dividend, but only a re-
capitalization,2 and that the testator "intended" (in the absence of a
contrary intent) to abide by the decisions of the board of directors.2 2
Certainly this "intent" to abide by the decisions of the board of directors
would seem to be a sound "presumption" in the case of stock in a large
corporation; and in the case of a small, closely-knit corporation, (a fact
which certainly must have been known to the testator at the time the
trust was created), the testator, if he did not desire to abide by
directors' decisions, could quite easily have inserted a contrary pro-
vision in the trust agreement. Relief from fraud or collusion on the
part of the remainderman and the directors to the detriment of the life
tenant, can always be granted by a court of equity. In the great majority
of cases, however, there will exist a bona fide board of directors declar-
ing a bona fide stock dividend. The danger of "imposing" upon the life
tenant under such circumstances seems indeed remote. Certainly the
Massachusetts rule cannot be said to do such violence to the settlor's
"intent" as to warrant a repudiation of the basic concept of a stock
dividend, an invasion of corporate management by the courts, and the
imposition of the complicated computations often necessary to determine
the effect of a proposed stock dividend upon the "intact value" of a
corpus created many years previously.
RICHARD P. BUELLESBACH
21 Supra, note 16. "As a matter of logic, it is difficult to resist the reasoning
leading to the conclusion that stock dividends are, in fact, principal; for the
life tenant, as is universally held, is not, in the absence of fraud or improper
conduct, entitled to the earnings until they are distributed. They are not, in
fact, distributed, but, on the contrary, put permanently into capital account
when new stock is, without any money equivalent, alloted to the whole body
of stockholders." Ballantine v. Young, 79 N.J.Eq. 70, 81 Atl. 119 (1911).
22,"The Massachusetts rule operates in perfect harmony with the testamentary
intent, assuming that when that intent is expressed in general terms there is
an implication that corporate policies and the recognized legal relations be-
tween the corporation and its stockholders should be the polestar of inter-
pretation." Lamb v. Lehmann, supra, note 1.
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